This template gives you a way to later prove that you are the person who was in control of your account on the day this template was placed. This is done by putting a code (called a "hash") on your user page so that, in the event that your account is compromised, you can convince someone else that you are really the person behind your username.
The intended use of this template is to help in the hopefully unlikely event that your account is compromised. If you published your real-life identity, then that identity could be used to reestablish contact with you if your account were compromised; keep in mind, in this scenario contact could not be established with you through your account, since it may be under the control of someone else. However, many Wikipedia users do not disclose their real-life identities, or disclose little enough of them that it may be difficult to establish their identity.
This is not a replacement for having a strong password, nor for registering an email address for your account. You should still do everything you can to prevent your account being compromised, including using a strong password and remembering to log yourself out when using a computer to which others may have access. If you have one, it may also be helpful to post your PGP public key. But even with the best of precautions, your account could become compromised, for instance, via a trojan horse or a brute-force attack on your password. This is intended to be a last resort.
The idea is to use cryptographic hashes; you choose a secret string known only to yourself, put it through a one-way hash function, and publish the result somewhere. It is infeasible to determine the secret string corresponding to the hash; hence, an attacker compromising an account presumably would not be able to supply the secret string.
{{user committed identity|hash|hash function used|background=CSS color|border=CSS color|article=grammatical article for the hash function}}Italicized text should be replaced with appropriate input, or its parameter should be removed. Parameters are represented by "parameter=value", and separated by vertical bars |.
For example, if your hash is "ef7c4c55a176bd20ed558aaefde21c4803080195" using SHA-1, and you want a light orange box with a black border, use the following code:
{{user committed identity|ef7c4c55a176bd20ed558aaefde21c4803080195|SHA-1|background=#FC9|border=#000}}to produce
Bare minimum: at least two forms of contact and a random string:
[email protected] 555-123-3456 fFfwq0DuDmMXj8hYTM3NTKeDhk
More complete example: full name, multiple forms of contact, contact information for trusted friends, and a random string:
Joe Schmoe. [email protected]. 555-123-3456. P.O. Box 1234, San Jose, CA. My best friend Bob's email: [email protected]. fFfwq0DuDmMXj8hYTM3NTKeDhk
After Joe uses the secret string, he can generate a new secret string with a new hash by merely changing the random characters at the end.
A comprehensive example including multiple trusted people and advanced options:
Joe Schmoe. [email protected]. 555-123-3456. P.O. Box 1234, San Jose, CA. My best friend Bob's contact info: [email protected], 555-234-5678 My wife's contact info: [email protected], 555-345-6789 Other accounts: http://www.youtube.com/user/joeschmoe http://flickr.com/photos/joeschmoe/ Driver's license number: 123456789, SSN: 123-45-6789, passport number: 9876H432L SHA-512 of joeschmoe.jpg: 747ec1836486a3dbe8a5d6805a2cc080fb8dc427d9535579ecb04c750d7a4a515641fd0411ed6bb97242a3e63ab9cbd4d6d66c27611ff5f98aa84497bf64b8a8 NSffKWSHaGbcTm3WGtE8hyUQ
In this case, Joe would supply both the above string (e.g. as a text file) and joeschmoe.jpg to administrative staff. Staff might ask him to post a specific comment on YouTube, to send a scan of his passport, or to video call to confirm that his appearance matches joeschmoe.jpg.
Be sure to note the exact string you enter into the form, in case you need to use it later. It is important that this string be both easily remembered exactly by you and hard to guess or find by any intruder - if an intruder knows the secret string, then this scheme is useless and provides no security. One's username is public and trivially guessable; one's password is not a good choice either, as in the event of a compromised account, the password is likely to have been guessed.
On Unix-like operating systems the md5sum, sha1sum, sha224sum, sha256sum, sha384sum, and sha512sum programs are provided in the GNU Core Utilities. Windows users may use one of the methods mentioned below; those who have PowerShell installed can generate a hash using the following command. Provide your secret phrase in the location indicated:
::tostring((new-object security.cryptography.sha512managed).computehash(::utf8.getbytes("Secret phrase here"))).replace("-", "")
It is recommended that SHA-512 be used, as cryptographic research casted doubt on the long-term security of SHA-1 as early as 2005, and since 2010 many organizations have been recommending its replacement (see Wikipedia). The template defaults to SHA-512 if the hash function parameter is omitted. For security, you should only use locally executed programs, or client-side javascript, to create your hash. Examples of such hash calculators include SHA512 Encrypt, jsSHA and HashCalc 2.01.
To verify that you are correctly hashing your secret string, you can try hashing 'My name is Joe Schmoe, and I can be contacted at: [email protected]' (without the enclosing single-quotes). The SHA-512 hash of that test string should be:
In case your account is compromised, to make use of your committed identity to someone and prove you are the same person who originally controlled the account, give a trusted user the exact secret string you originally entered into the box. They can then compute the appropriate hash of that same string and verify that it is the same result and that you are who you say you are.
Once you've established your identity, and set up a new account or regained control of the original account, you'll probably want to create a new hash as now someone (possibly multiple someones depending on how and to whom you communicated the secret string) else knows the secret string.
This technique of establishing identity by revealing the secret string behind the hash is not inherently attack proof; it increases attacker effort substantially (if the secret string is chosen and handled properly) which is worthwhile, and does so at little effort to the legitimate user. But it is attackable in that anyone can invent their own secret string, hash it, and claim an identity.
An attacker with access to the account could overwrite the hash with their own one. They could then say that the previous owner of the account was an attacker who claimed their identity and generated his own hash.
An attacker without access to the account could claim that the current account's owner stole their identity. The attacker could state that they did not publish a hash when they used to own the account, or that they did not register an account and that someone else is using their name.
This weakness does not indicate that the commitment is worthless, because the commit phase did not apply to all interested parties (the real person and all potential attackers).